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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this personal injury action filed against the United 
States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 
S 1346, the United States appeals from an order of the 
District Court directing that the United States pay interest 
on a judgment entered against it at the rate set forth in the 
Virgin Islands Code, 5 V.I.C.S 426, rather than pursuant to 
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the generally applicable rate formula set forth at 28 U.S.C. 
S 1961. We are convinced that the calculation should have 
been undertaken in accordance with the pr ovisions of 
section 1961. Accordingly, we will reverse the order of the 
District Court. 
 
I. 
 
Thomas Alkon, a St. Croix attorney, was seriously injured 
in a fall on the stairs at the Federal Courthouse on St. 
Croix. Following a bench trial in an action br ought 
pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, Alkon was 
awarded a judgment in the amount of $2,463,750. 1 The 
United States paid the judgment and interest on that 
judgment calculated according to the for mula set forth in 
28 U.S.C. S 1961. 
 
Thereafter, Alkon filed a motion in the District Court 
seeking to have interest due on the judgment r ecalculated 
at the higher 9% rate set in 5 V.I.C. S 426. The motion was 
granted. This timely appeal followed. 
 
II. 
 
This appeal requires that we deter mine which of two 
statutory provisions controls the calculation of interest 
applicable to the judgment awarded in this action. We begin 
by noting that in almost all instances, the calculation of 
interest on a judgment rendered against the United States 
in a civil action is governed by the pr ovisions of 28 U.S.C. 
S 1961.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The United States filed an appeal, and the order entering judgment in 
favor of Alkon was affirmed. Alkon v. United States, 185 F.3d 861 (3d 
Cir. 1999). 
 
2. Prior to 1982, section 1961 provided that interest on civil judgments 
obtained in district courts would be calculated at the rate set by state 
law. The interest rate on FTCA judgments against the United States, 
however, was set at 4% by 28 U.S.C. S 2411. In 1982, Congress deleted 
section 2411's uniform rate applicable to FTCA judgments and made 
section 1961 applicable to such judgments. Congr ess also established a 
uniform rate for district court judgments under section 1961, changing 
the prior practice of determining inter est rates in accordance with state 
law. Section 1961 now reads as follows: 
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The District Court held that section 1961 should not 
apply in this case because the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands is not a "district court" for purposes of the statute. 
Accordingly, the District Court found that interest on the 
judgment awarded to Alkon should be calculated with 
reference to 5 V.I.C. S 426, which provides that: "The rate of 
interest on judgments and decrees for the payment of 
money shall be 9 percent per annum." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       S 1961. Interest 
 
        (a) Interest shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil 
case 
       recovered in a district court. Execution therefor may be levied by 
the 
       marshal, in any case where, by the law of the State in which such 
       court is held, execution may be levied for inter est on judgments 
       recovered in the courts of the State. Such interest shall be 
       calculated from the date of the entry of the judgment, at a rate 
       equal to the coupon issue yield equivalent (as deter mined by the 
       Secretary of the Treasury) of the average accepted auction price 
for 
       the last auction of fifty-two week United States T reasury bills 
settled 
       immediately prior to the date of the judgment. The Director of the 
       Administrative Office of the United States Courts shall distribute 
       notice of that rate and any changes in it to all Federal judges. 
 
        (b) Interest shall be computed daily to the date of payment except 
       as provided in section 2516(b) of this title and section 1304(b) of 
       title 31, and shall be compounded annually. 
 
        (c)(1) This section shall not apply in any judgment of any court 
       with respect to any internal revenue tax case. Interest shall be 
       allowed in such cases at the underpayment rate or overpayment rate 
       (whichever is appropriate) established under section 6621 of the 
       Internal Revenue Code of 1986. 
 
        (2) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (1) of this 
       subsection, interest shall be allowed on allfinal judgments against 
       the United States in the United States Court of Appeals for the 
       Federal [C]ircuit, at the rate pr ovided in subsection (a) and as 
       provided in subsection (b). 
 
        (3) Interest shall be allowed, computed, and paid on judgments of 
       the United States Court of Federal Claims only as pr ovided in 
       paragraph (1) of this subsection or in any other pr ovision of law. 
 
        (4) This section shall not be construed to af fect the interest on 
any 
       judgment of any court not specified in this section. 
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In reaching this conclusion, the District Court found that 
strict construction of the term "district court" as used in 
section 1961 is appropriate in light of the pr ohibition set 
forth in section 1961(c)(4): "[Section 1961] shall not be 
construed to affect the interest on any judgment of any 
court not specified in this section." 
 
In order to determine whether Congr ess did, in fact, 
intend that the interest formula set forth in section 1961 
not apply to FTCA judgments obtained in the District Court 
of the Virgin Islands, the District Court first looked to 28 
U.S.C. S 451. That section reads in part: 
 
       The term "court of the United States" includes the 
       Supreme Court of the United States, courts of appeals, 
       district courts constituted by chapter 5 of this title, 
       including the Court of International T rade and any 
       court created by Act of Congress the judges of which 
       are entitled to hold office during good behavior. 
 
       The terms "district court" and "district court of the 
       United States" mean the courts constituted by chapter 
       5 of this title. 
 
Chapter 5 of Title 28, 28 U.S.C. SS 81-144, provides for the 
constitution of the district courts of the fifty states, the 
District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. As the District Court 
in this matter recognized, 
 
       Conspicuously absent from the [Chapter V] list are the 
       district courts of the Virgin Islands, Guam, and the 
       Northern Mariana Islands, which were established 
       pursuant to 48 U.S.C. SS 1611, 1424, and 1694, 
       respectively. 
 
Alkon v. United States, No. 139F/1995, mem. opinion at 2 
(D.V.I. Feb. 15, 2000). 
 
According to the District Court, since the District Court 
of the Virgin Islands was not constituted by Chapter 5, it is 
not a "district court" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. S 1961; that 
section, therefore, does not establish the applicable interest 
rate. The District Court summarized its holding as follows: 
 
       While the matter is not altogether free fr om doubt, I 
       conclude for several reasons that the corr ect rate of 
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       post-judgment interest to be awarded in the District 
       Court of the Virgin Islands is the 9% rate prescribed by 
       5 V.I.C. S 426. First, I must consider the mandatory 
       language of 28 U.S.C. S 1961(c)(4), which limits the 
       application of that section to only those courts 
       specified therein. . . . Second, I am r eluctant to 
       substantially invalidate a section of the Vir gin Islands 
       Code absent some compelling reason to do so. 3 Finally, 
       calculating interest on judgments against the United 
       States at the same rate as other Virgin Islands 
       judgments is consistent with the overall theme of the 
       Federal Tort Claim Act itself, which is to r ender the 
       government liable to the same extent as private 
       tortfeasors. 
 
Alkon v. U. S., mem. op. at 3. 
 
III. 
 
We agree with the District Court that r esolution of the 
issue raised in this appeal turns on whether Congress 
intended to mandate a technical reading of the term 
"district court" as used in 28 U.S.C. S 1961(a) when it 
provided in 28 U.S.C. S 1961(c)(4) that:"[t]his section 
[providing for the calculation of inter est rates] shall not be 
construed to affect the interest on any judgment of any 
court not specified in this section." W e do not, however, 
agree with the District Court's conclusion that the term 
"district court" must be read to exclude application of 
section 1961 to judgments entered against the United 
States pursuant to the FTCA in the District Court of the 
Virgin Islands. 
 
In declining to adopt a reading of section 1961 which 
would make it inapplicable to the judgment obtained here, 
we are guided by our decision in In r e Jaritz, 151 F.3d 93 
(3d Cir. 1998). There, we were asked to determine whether 
28 U.S.C. S 155 authorized the Third Cir cuit Judicial 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. A finding that interest, in this matter , should be calculated with 
reference to section 1961 would not invalidate 5 V.I.C. S 426. Section 
426 would still be applied to calculate inter est on judgments rendered by 
the Territorial Court of the Vir gin Islands. 
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Council to transfer bankruptcy judges to the V irgin Islands. 
This determination hinged on a narrow question: "[W]hat 
did Congress intend when it used the ter m `judicial district' 
in section 155." Id. at 97. "Did it use the term in a generic 
sense to refer to the geographic area in which a district 
court exercises judicial authority in bankruptcy matters, or 
did it intend its scope to be limited to the geographic area 
in which an Article III district court exercises judicial 
authority over such matters." Id. 
 
In order to answer this question, we first considered the 
statutory text, finding nothing that would "limit[ ] its scope 
to judicial districts having an Article III district court." Id. 
at 97. We next considered relevant legislative history, and 
again failed to find any indication to suggest"an intent to 
restrict the authorization conferred by section 155 to Article 
III districts." Id. 
 
Not finding the statutory text or the legislative history to 
be dispositive, we "inquire[d] whether the broader or the 
narrower reading of `judicial district'[would] best service 
Congress's objectives in enacting Chapter 6 and section 
155 in particular." Id. at 98. W e identified the objective of 
Chapter 6 as the creation of "a reor ganized bankruptcy 
system in which a specialized corps of full-time bankruptcy 
judges would assist district court judges in adjudicating 
bankruptcy matters." Id. We identified the objective of 
section 155 as the "efficient and effective use of that corps 
of full-time bankruptcy judges." Id. Interpreting Congress's 
use of the term "judicial district" in light of the purpose 
underlying the statute, we were unable to discern "any 
reason Congress might have wished to gar ner the 
efficiencies provided by [section 155] for judicial districts 
having an Article III district court and not for judicial 
districts having an Article IV district court which exercises 
the jurisdiction of an Article III by virtue of the legislation 
that created it." Id. 
 
Finally, we addressed the dilemma posed by the 
application of 28 U.S.C. S 451's limited definition of a 
"district court" as a court constituted under Article III. We 
wrote: 
 
       While we, of course, recognize that a definitional 
       section like section 451 must presumptively be taken 
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       as reflecting the Congressional intent when a defined 
       term is used even in subsequent legislation, it is not 
       controlling where consideration of the ter m's immediate 
       context and its place in the overall Congressional 
       scheme clearly indicate that it is being used not as a 
       defined term of art but in its commonly understood 
       sense. 
 
Id. at 100. 
 
We found support for our analysis of the applicability of 
section 451 in the Supreme Court's decision in Int'l 
Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Juneau Spruce 
Corp., 342 U.S. 237 (1952). There, the IL WU filed suit 
against Juneau Spruce in the District Court for the 
Territory of Alaska, alleging violations of the Labor 
Management Relations Act. Section 303(b) of that Act 
provided that an action for violation of its pr ovision could 
be brought "in any district court of the United States." 
Addressing whether the District Court of Alaska had 
jurisdiction over the matter, the Supr eme Court accorded 
great weight to the underlying purpose of the LMRA, 
concluding that: 
 
       [S]ince Congress lifted the restrictive requirements 
       which might preclude suit in courts having the district 
       courts' jurisdiction, we think it is more consonant with 
       the uniform, national policy of the Act to hold that 
       those restrictions were lifted as r espects all courts 
       upon which the jurisdiction of a district court has been 
       conferred. That reading of the Act does not, to be sure, 
       take the words "district court of the United States" in 
       their historic, technical sense. But literalness is no 
       sure touchstone of legislative purpose. The purpose 
       here is more closely approximated, we believe, by 
       giving the historic phrase a looser, mor e liberal 
       meaning in the special context of this legislation. 
 
342 U.S. at 242-43. 
 
In Jaritz, we concluded that the analysis undertaken in 
Juneau Spruce applied with equal force: 
 
       Although the term "judicial district" as defined 
       elsewhere in the Judicial Code refers only to the 
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       specifically enumerated district courts, the purpose of 
       section 155 -- ensuring maximally efficient use of 
       judicial resources -- is "mor e closely approximated" by 
       a more pragmatic and flexible construction of that term.4 
 
151 F.3d at 101. 
 
Recognizing that our resolution of the question presented 
in Jaritz is relevant to the issue raised here, the District 
Court in this matter cited Jaritz, r elying on our opinion to 
support its conclusion that in light of the section 1961(c)(4) 
limitation, the meaning of the term "district court" as used 
in 1961(a) should be restricted to the definition set forth in 
28 U.S.C. S 451. The District Court also concluded that 
"calculating interest on judgments against the United 
States at the same rate as other Virgin Islands judgments 
is consistent with the overall theme of the Federal Tort 
Claims Act itself, which is to render the gover nment liable 
to the same extent as private tortfeasors." Alkon v. U.S., 
mem. op. at 4. 
 
IV. 
 
While we agree with the District Court that this matter 
should be resolved with reference to the analysis in Jaritz, 
we are convinced that faithful adherence to that analysis 
better supports the view that the interest rate applicable to 
the judgment in this case should be calculated in 
accordance with section 1961 rather than pursuant to the 
Virgin Islands Code. First, the language of section 1961 
itself does not -- even considering the section c(4) limitation 
-- unequivocally preclude its application to the District 
Court for the Virgin Islands. 
 
The legislative history of section 1961, too, is devoid of 
any reference to the Virgin Islands and does not suggest 
why Congress might have intended that FTCA judgments 
reached in the District Court of the Vir gin Islands not be 
subject to the provisions of section 1961. What scant 
legislative history there is suggests the opposite. Section 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We then found that, section 155 notwithstanding, bankruptcy judges 
could be authorized to serve temporarily in judicial districts of Article 
IV 
courts under the provisions of an alter nate statutory section. 
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1961 was amended, as part of the Federal Courts 
Improvement Act of 1982, to standardize the calculation of 
interest rates applicable to civil judgments obtained in 
federal court. Instead of continuing the practice of 
calculating interest on civil judgments in accordance with 
varying state formulae, Congress intended, in amending 
section 1961, to "set[ ] a realistic and [uniform] rate of 
interest on judgments" which would be "applicable to all 
litigation in the Federal courts." S. Rep. No. 97-275, at 30 
(1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. p. 11, 40 (emphasis 
added).5 
 
Nothing in the legislative history supports the notion that 
Congress, in drafting the 1961(c)(4) limitation, had the 
District Court for the Virgin Islands or any other non- 
Article III court in mind. In view of the emphasis on rate 
uniformity, we cannot agree with the District Court that 
Congress intended that judgments in the V irgin Islands be 
subject to an interest rate not prevailing anywhere else in 
the federal system. 
 
We are also convinced that under the approach outlined 
in Jaritz, the definition of "district court" and its use in 
section 1961 should be assessed, not, as the District Court 
found, in terms of the scope of the Federal T ort Claims Act, 
but in terms of section 1961 itself. The District Court 
wrote, "[C]alculating interest on judgments against the 
United States at the same rate as other Vir gin Islands 
judgments is consistent with the overall theme of the 
Federal Tort Claims Act itself, which is to r ender the 
government liable to the same extent as private 
tortfeasors." Alkon v. U.S., mem. op. at 3. We focus instead 
on the legislative intent underlying section 1961 and are 
convinced that in amending that section Congr ess intended 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Although section 1961 does explicitly mention the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit and the Court of Federal Claims, it is likely that 
this 
mention flows from the fact that these courts were created pursuant to 
the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982. Section 1961 was amended 
as part of that same legislation and sought, by r eference to these 
courts, 
to clarify certain aspects of their operation. W e cannot infer from the 
specific mention of these courts that Congr ess intended that section 
1961 not apply to judgments obtained in the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands. 
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to place all FTCA litigants obtaining judgments against the 
United States in a district court on the same footing; 
reading the term "district court" so as to exclude the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands would destroy the very 
uniformity that Congress sought to achieve. 
 
Looking, as we did in Jaritz, at the statute itself, its 
legislative history, and the purpose underlying the 
enactment, we are satisfied that the ter m "district court" as 
it is used in section 1961 should be read "not as a defined 
term of art but in its commonly understood sense" to 
include the District Court of the Vir gin Islands. In re Jaritz, 
151 F.3d at 100. 
 
V. 
 
Adherence to the analysis set forth in Jaritz provides 
sufficient reason for us to conclude that the interest 
calculation in this matter is controlled by the provisions of 
section 1961. In the interest of completeness, however, we 
note that factors outside the scope of our decision in Jaritz 
also favor application of section 1961. 
 
First, the use of the term "district court" in 28 U.S.C. 
S 2414 which authorizes the "payment offinal judgments 
rendered by a district court . . . against the United States" 
and in 28 U.S.C. S 1304, which refers to section 2414 and 
appropriates amounts necessary to pay final judgments 
against the United States and interest ther eon has not been 
interpreted to exclude the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands. To adopt the District Court's r eading of section 
1961 would, as the government points out,"accord[ ] the 
phrase `district court' one meaning as used in the 
provisions authorizing the United States to pay such 
judgments with interest, and another meaning as used in 
the [closely related] provision specifying the rate of interest 
owing on such judgments." 
 
Second, we agree with the government that the District 
Court's determination that the Vir gin Islands Code controls 
the calculation of interest impinges upon the sovereign 
immunity for interest of the United States. The United 
States' waiver of sovereign immunity for inter est for 
purposes of the FTCA is set forth at 31 U.S.C. S 1304 and 
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is subject to strict construction. See, e.g., Andrulonis v. 
United States, 26 F.3d 1224, 1231 (2d Cir . 1994). The 
District Court's analysis of section 1961 does not consider 
the scope of the United States' waiver and, as the 
government argues, "subjects the United States to greater 
liability in [this] case," and "puts it at the mercy of the 
Virgin Islands legislature mor e generally, requiring the 
federal government to pay whatever rate of interest the 
Virgin Islands legislature may enact." 
 
Finally, we find support for our application of section 
1961 in the provisions of S 1614(b) which were enacted as 
part of the 1984 amendments to the Revised Or ganic Act of 
1954. That section directs that the provisions of Title 28 
"shall apply" to the District Court of the V irgin Islands 
"[w]here appropriate." W e examined the reach of this 
directive in Walker v. Gover nment of the Virgin Islands, 230 
F.3d 82 (3d Cir. 2000), concluding: 
 
       [H]aving vested the District Court of the V irgin Islands 
       with the jurisdiction of the district courts of the United 
       States, Congress intended all of the pr ovisions of Title 
       28, which speak to procedure, jurisdiction, venue, and 
       particular proceedings (e.g., habeas), to apply, "[w]here 
       appropriate," to the District Court of the V irgin Islands. 
 
Id. at 87.6 Alkon has been unable to identify and we have 
not found any policy concern or other consideration that 
would render the calculation of interest in this matter 
pursuant to section 1961 "inappropriate." We agree with 
the government that, "there is no plausible basis for 
considering it `inappropriate' to apply the same rate of 
interest to the judgments rendered by the District Court of 
the Virgin Islands as is applied to judgments rendered by 
the district courts of the fifty States and Puerto Rico." In 
fact, in at least one Virgin Islands case, we applied section 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The legislative history of 48 U.S.C. S 1614(b) indicates that Congress 
intended that "the only exception to this extension [of Title 28 to the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands] will be those provisions which are 
in 
conflict with specific legislation applicable to the Virgin Islands and 
those 
relating to judges who are appointed during good behavior." 130 Cong. 
Rec. 23,790 (August 10, 1984) (statement of Sen. W eiker). The provisions 
of section 1961 do not fall into either category. 
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1961 to the award of post-judgment inter est in a civil case, 
never questioning that section's application. Dunn v. Hovic, 
13 F.3d 58 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
In sum, we find that construction of the ter m "district 
court" in related statutes, concerns bearing on sovereign 
immunity, and the applicability of 48 U.S.C. S 1614(b) 
bolster our analysis of the factors identified in Jaritz, and 
provide additional support for applying section 1961 to 
calculate the amount of interest owed on the judgment 
awarded to Alkon. 
 
VI. 
 
We hold that interest on judgments obtained against the 
United States in the District Court of the V irgin Islands 
pursuant to the FTCA, should be calculated in accor dance 
with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. S 1961. Accordingly, we will 
reverse the order of the District Court. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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